Abstract-Providing forward and backward secrecy is still a big challenge in Unattended Wireless Sensor Networks (UWSNs), though some storage schemes have been proposed. Additionally, high storage requirement needs efficient storage techniques. In this paper, we propose a novel homomorphic encryption and key-evolution based scheme for efficient and secure data storage, which supports both forward and backward secrecy in UWSNs. We show that the stored data based on our scheme can be used to efficiently compute statistic values, e.g., expected value and variance of the sensed data, and at the same time the storage cost is significantly reduced using our scheme. Detailed analysis has been conducted to evaluate the scheme in terms of efficiency and security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Research aspects of security in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) has gained some progress [1] recently in the research community. Most proposed security schemes, however, are based on assumption that a trusted party (sink or base station) is always available, leading to that unnormal actions of compromised sensors can be detected by the on-line sink [2] . However, in Unattended WSNs (UWSNs) [3] , there is no static sink but a mobile sink periodically accesses the UWSN to collect data instead, and the sensor nodes store their sensed data locally or at some special designated nodes within the network till a mobile sink visit, instead of immediately forwarding the data to a centralized location out of the network.
In such a network, a mobile adversary [3] (we denote it as ADV hereafter), which behaves in UWSNs when the mobile sink is absent, can steal data stored in compromised sensors without modifying any sensed data, and interfering with communications of any sensors. In other words, the mobile adversary is read-only data during the mobile sink visiting interval, which is impossible to detect by the mobile sink. When a sensor is compromised, as the corresponding secret key is also revealed, the mobile adversary can obtain the encrypted data using the secret key. Therefore, providing data confidentiality is a big challenge. Additionally, in the unattended areas, such as environment monitoring in humanbeing unfriendly areas, the users of UWSNs usually interested in some "history" data rather "live" data. For instance, what is the average temperature in one month, what is the average activities of volcano in half a year, etc,. Furthermore, in contrast with traditional WSNs, the sensors cannot offload data to an on-line sink at will, instead they will store the data locally till a mobile sink accesses it to retrieve the data. Transmission happens only when the mobile sink visits the UWSN and broadcasts data retrieval requests. Consequently, each sensor must accumulate sensed data and have ability to wait long enough until a mobile sink visits it. Since the memory size of sensor nodes is limited, the storage efficiency problem has to be solved.
In this paper, we propose a novel homomorphic encryption and key evolution based scheme for efficient and secure data storage. In our scheme, secret keys of sensors are updated in each round according to one-way hash function. In other words, previous keys cannot be derived from current keys. Forward secrecy is guaranteed. Additionally, storing data collected by sensors are encrypted by using homomorphic encryption and stored as sum of encrypted data and sum of encrypted data squares in sensor memory. Thus, statistic values, such as expected value, variance value, can be easily computed based on those encrypted data values, which can significantly reduce the storage needs. Furthermore, combined with homomorphic encryption and key evolution, our scheme can guarantee both forward secrecy and backward secrecy. We show through detailed analysis that our scheme has low storage cost and low computational cost as compared to other existing schemes and can be suitable for resource-constraint UWSNs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the background and related work. In Section III, the network model and threat model are addressed. Section IV provides the detailed description of our proposed schemes. Section V analyzes performance of the scheme. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this section, we introduce related work and some necessary background for our proposed scheme.
A. Related Work
Achieving data confidentiality in UWSNs is a big challenge because there is no an on-line sink presented. The authors in [4] divide the data collected by sensors into three cases, based on the time when data were compromised: a) before compromise, b) during compromise, and c) after compromise. Since, in case b), sensors are fully controlled, data generated in interval b) are revealed no matter what security schemes are adopted.
To guarantee both forward secrecy and backward secrecy, [4] proposed Distributed Self-Healing scheme (DISH) based on nodes reactive cooperation that provides both forward and (probabilistically) backward secrecy. However, the reactive node cooperative scheme causes extra communication overhead. The authors in [5] proposed a proactive node cooperative scheme which solves the aforementioned problem of [4] . However, both [4] and [5] provided merely certain probabilistically backward secrecy, in an application scenario where reliable communication channels or reliable sensors are needed. To solve this problem, [5] suggested that some suitable public key encryption technique can be used to encrypt round-specific sensor key. However, sensors are known as computation constrained devices that are not very suitable for public key encryption.
B. Homomorphic Encryption
A privacy homomorphism [6] is an encryption function which allows the encrypted data to be operated on without the knowledge of the decryption function.
The authors in [7] proposed an additive homomorphic encryption scheme such that the addition of the encrypted messages equals the encryption of those messages' summation. The addition of n ciphertexts,
III. NETWORK MODEL, THREAT MODEL AND NOTATIONS
This section presents our network model, threat model and notations.
A. Network Model
We consider a UWSN that consists of N sensor nodes. A sensor node in UWSN is denoted as
There is a mobile sink that visits the UWSN periodically to collect data, (It can be more than one sink in practice. For simplicity, we consider only one mobile sink in the paper.). The sensor s i generates data at every round, and the data generated at round r is denoted as d r i . Since sensors have specific sensing task, we assume that data generated in each round requires the same memory where the data are operated in GF (2 p 
where R is the number of rounds between successive sink visits. We further assume that the data d r i generated in each round is not a large value (e.g., p = 64 or 160, etc, here, we don't consider audio WSN and multimedia WSN.). Once a data value d r i is generated, d r i is stored locally, and waits until an authorized mobile sink requires them offload it. Each sensor has the ability to perform one-way hashing and symmetric key encryption. We assume that the mobile sink is a trusted party which cannot be compromised. Additionally, the mobile sink will offload the data accumulated in sensor nodes, re-initializes the secret keys and reset the round counters when the mobile sink visits the network.
B. Threat Model
In this paper, we investigate that ADV that is only interested in stealing (read-only) the data from the compromised sensor nodes and cannot be detected by the mobile sink. ADV can compromise sensor nodes during the time interval when the mobile sink is absent. Consequently, the mobile adversary can visit the UWSN again and again until the whole network is compromised by it without knowing by the mobile sink. Here, we assume that an adversary can compromise up to v(v < N) sensors in one interval.
C. Notations
Our notation is listed in Table I . 
IV. PROPOSED SCHEME In this section, we propose a family of four schemes for efficient and secure data storage. Our goal is to guarantee both forward and backward secrecy while maintaining low storage cost and low computation cost.
A. Scheme 1 (S1)
Initially, the mobile sink picks a master key denoted as K m . The initial key of a sensor node s i can be computed as K i = h(K m ||i) which is setup before the deployment of the UWSN. Here, || stands for the concatenation operator. The mobile sink needs to store only one key, because it can use K m to compute all the secret keys deployed in s i (1 ≤ i ≤ N ). Then, at round r ≥ 1, as it collects data, sensor s i encrypts data d
Computation of expected value and variance. 1) To compute expected value, the mobile sink needs to retrieve the encrypted data Enc(d
) from the sensor s i , and then decrypts the encrypted data using its master key K m by generating corresponding secret key, that
, the expected value of data can be easily computed as
2) The variance of data can be computed as
Discussion. Before the mobile sink retrieves the data, the sensor s i generates R rounds data. So the storage cost of encrypted data in sensor memory can be denoted as
. If the value R tends to be a very large value, e.g., 100000, the storage cost tends to a large value as well. Since our goal is to get expected value and variance of data, we transform Eq.(2) as following:
Given Sum
(1) and Eq. (3) can be further presented as
and
In other words, to compute EX i and V ar i , the mobile sink need to get Sum is less than storing the encryptions of data generated in each rounds, if R > 1 and p > 1.
Since in UWSN setting, given R tends to a very large value, e.g., 10000, and p is a fixed small value, the storage cost reduce significantly (as shown in Fig. 1 are stored instead. Thus, these motivate us to design a data summation scheme that can reduce storage cost.
B. Scheme 2 (S2)
The S2 is detailed as follows: Initially, the sensor s i allocates two parameters Sum and decrypts data at each round, which causes very high computation burden. This limitation motivates us to design next scheme that can reduce computation cost and yet maintain low storage cost.
C. Scheme 3 (S3)
To deal with the limitation in S2, we now propose a homomorphic encryption based scheme. In this scheme, we utilize additive homomorphic encryption to encrypt new sensed data such that sum of encrypted data corresponds to encryption of those message summation, that is
Due to the properties of additive homomorphic encryption, we can obtain Enc(d
). Thus, EncSum and EncSumS can be obtained by
Therefore, the sensor s i does not need to decrypt and encrypt at each round to get Sum and SumS, but simply add the encrypted data up:
2 ). In the end of round r, as shown in Algorithm 2, the sensor s i encrypt the data d r i by using homomorphic encryption and its secret key
Each encrypted data is added with previous encrypted data and stored locally, SumEnc 
Computation of expected value and variance. After the mobile sink retrieves the SumEnc and SumEncS, it can decrypt them according to Eq. (8) and Eq. (9) to get Sum and SumS by using key R * K i . Then, the expected value and variance can be easily computed according to Eq. (4) and Eq. (5). An Example. For simplicity, we assume that the sensor s 5 generates 3 rounds data, d Discussion. Comparing to the S2, the S3 supports both low storage cost and low computation cost. However, a problem is raised if a ADV compromises the sensor s i at round r . The secret key K i of s i is hold by the ADV . Consequentially, all the data generated in previous rounds r ∈ [0, r ) will be revealed, because the ADV can use K i to compute corresponding secret key (r − 1) * K i . Furthermore, new generated encrypted data are also encrypted by the same key, which means generated data can be decrypted by ADV by using the key K i as well. To guarantee both forward secrecy and backward secrecy, we propose the next scheme.
D. Scheme 4(S4)
If the sensor keeps the secret unchanging, all encrypted data can be read by ADV , no matter the data are generated before or after the compromised period, for it only needs to compromise the sensor once and gets the secret key consequently. Therefore, we need to change the secret key after each round to guarantee that the ADV who holds the secret key K r i in compromised period r ∈ [r , r ] cannot derive the secret key Kr i in the previous roundsr ∈ [0, r ). To solve this problem, we utilize key evolution approach [8] , that is, the secret key of a sensor node is updated by its owner. The secret key of s i in round r is computed as
is then securely erased.). After the secret key K r i updates itself at the end of round r, the ADV cannot derive the previous round's key before the sensor was compromised (due to h(·) one-way property). Additionally, the mobile sink can easily compute the corresponding secret key of sensor s i in round r for
To decrypt the EncSum and EncSumS, similar to Eq. (8) and Eq. (9), after computing the corresponding secret key as
, the mobile sink can get SumEnc and SumEncS as following:
Similar to S3, the S4 has the same homomorphic encryption and decryption process but the secret key. Algorithm 3 shows the operation process in sensor s i .
; / * sensor si starts round r * / collect new sensed data d Proof: Since key evolution is adopted in the S4, the ADV cannot derive the previous key from the current key it hold due to the one way property of hash function, thus the ADV cannot decrypt the data encrypted in previous rounds, which means the forward secrecy is guaranteed. Moreover, the data generated in previous rounds are stored as SumEnc and SumEncS in sensor nodes. To decrypt them, the corresponding secret key R r=1 K r i is needed, which consists of all keys generated in each rounds. Since the previous keys cannot be derived from current key, the corresponding key
cannot be obtained by ADV , that means backward secrecy is guaranteed. Therefore, the S4 can guarantee both forward secrecy and backward secrecy.
V. ANALYSIS
In this section, we investigate numeric performance of the proposed schemes with respect to storage cost, and computational cost. Security analysis is also given in this section. Fig.1 (left) shows the analysis results of proposed schemes in term of storage cost. We can observe that the S1 has the highest storage cost in all four proposed schemes no matter p = 64 or 128, and that the rest three scheme has the lowest storage cost, that means the storing summation of data can significantly reduce the storage cost in sensors. We further observe that the storage cost of S2, S3, and S4 are almost zero when they are compared with S1, and the influence of p cannot be identified. Therefore, as shown in Fig.1 (right) , we ignore the storage cost of S1, where only S2, S3, and S4 are plotted in terms of p = 64 and p = 128, respectively. We observe that p can increases with a little influence on the storage cost. The number of rounds (round) Storage Cost (bit) S1, p=64 S2, p=64 S3, p=64 S4, p=64 S1, p=128 S2, p=128 S3, p=128 S4, p=128 S2, p=64 S3, p=64 S4, p=64 S2, p=128 S3, p=128 S4, p=128 
A. Storage Cost

B. Computation Cost
In S1, sensors encrypts data sensed in each round and stores them locally. In S3 and S4, sensors encrypts data by doing simply modulo arithmetic in each round, which based on homomorphic encryption. In S2, however, sensors decrypts encrypted data sum, updates new data sum, and encrypts it again which causes extra computational cost.
C. Security Analysis
In S1, S2, and S3, both forward secrecy and backward secrecy cannot be guaranteed for the secret key is the same in each round. Once the secret key is compromised, all the encrypted data are revealed. As discussed in Section IV-D Proposition 4.2, the S4 can guarantee both forward secrecy and backward secrecy.
Finally, we summarize the comparison results between S1, S2, S3 and S4 in TABLE II in terms of storage cost, computation cost, Forward Secrecy (FSe) and Backward Secrecy (ASe). TABLE II shows the conclusion that S4 has the best conformance compared with the rest three schemes in terms of storage cost and computation cost, and that S4 can further guarantee forward secrecy and backward secrecy. VI. CONCLUSION In this paper, we have proposed a novel homomorphic encryption and key evolution based scheme for efficient and secure data storage in UWSN. Detailed analysis demonstrates that our schemes accomplish the goals of data confidentiality and efficiency with respect to storage and computation.
